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FEUDALISM AS A TROPE OR DISCOURSE FOR THE ASIAN PAST 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THAILAND 
Craig J. Reynolds 
Feudalism in Asian Historiography 
The problem that will interest me in this essay is the existence 
of terms for feudalism in Asian-language discourses about past 
and present society and what the writer in English - anthropologist, 
literary scholar, historian, linguist, whatever - is to do with these 
feudalisms. Why do native speakers of Asian languages term their 
own societies "feudal" (feudal = term in language X) and how do 
they come to employ this term? Generally, Western writers dismiss 
these Asian-language feudalisms as too culture-bound to be of 
use in writing objective history. Such usage, so the argument 
might run, is too embedded in internal debates within Asian societies 
about who should - or should not - hold power. That is, "feudalism" 
is a category of social evolution that serves revolutionary or official 
nationalist interests, and such interests so skew its usage that 
the term cannot tell the disinterested observer anything illuminating 
about the political economy of a particular society. 
Western academic historians more or less agree that while 
Asian social systems functioned with ties of bondage, subordination, 
and even vassalage, the lack of parcellized sovereignty, the absence 
of a fief system, and various other elements deemed critical to 
European feudalism have all disqualified Asian societies from 
being knighted with this term so essential to the evolution of 
Western society and the emergence of the capitalist economic 
system. Moreover, use of the term feudal for Asian societies 
violates a principal of cultural relativism for most students of 
Asia, because it assimilates Asian societies to the Western 
evolutionary schema, thereby denying those societies uniqueness 
and autonomy. To put the matter slightly differently, I suspect 
that most supervisors of dissertations on Philippine, Thai, Chinese, 
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Vietnamese, or Burmese history, written in Western universities, 
would want to scrub the term feudalism from early drafts. The 
term is too problematic and begs too many questions. Yet many 
Asian historians writing in the vernacular insist on using the term 
precisely because it does hook Asian development onto an historicist 
or universal evolutionary sequence. 
There are exceptions to these generalizations, particularly 
Japan and India. Japanese society, it is argued, experienced a 
feudal period, meaning that Japanese society at one time bore 
resemblances to Western feud!il society, resemblances strong 
enough to make the term illuminating as a category) It is no 
coincidence that the exception of Japan is also the one case of 
an Asian society approaching "parity" with Western countries 
in terms of industrialization, economic growth, hegemony of its 
commercial and business organization, and so forth. The parity 
even extends to such Westernisms as competence in playing 
Beethoven, making "Scotch" whiskey, and collecting Rembrandts. 
Indeed, the feudal element in the Japanese past is deemed to 
help account for Japan's economic, industrial, and cultural prowess 
and its successful modernization. 
Feudalism in the historiography of India is a slightly different 
kind of exception, because so much Indian history is written in 
English, thus clouding the distinction between feudalism (in English) 
as applied to Indian history by Indian histor·ians and feudalism 
(in English, French, Dutch, whatever) as applied to Europe in the 
Middle Ages. I would argue that the signifieds of these two 
feudalisms are quite distinct, and that the evidence for this may 
be found in the preference among Western historians and social 
scientists, who are not much enamored of the idea of an Indian 
feudal past, for other terms, such as segmentarv state. to 
characterize pre-modern Indian society.2 But it must also be 
recalled that for more than a half centurv after the Rebellion 
of 1857-58 feudalism played a part in con~tructing a theory of 
Indian society that the British in their colonial historiography 
used to answer the important question, "how are we going to keep 
India?"3 The feudal theory of Indian society served the British 
as a sociology, a classificatory system in which the British monarch 
and the "natural leaders" of India were placed in r·elation to one 
another as the dominant and the subordinated. In this discourse 
the feudal classification inscribed relations of domination in the 
legal language of "obligations", "rights", and "duties". Moreover, 
such a classification labelled local society and its power-holders 
as reactionary and passe, thus preparing the way for interference 
with them in the name of progress. Other Western colonial powers 
used the feudal classification in similar ways. As independence 
movements gained momentum, young nationalists picked up the 
classification as a convenient way of "reducing" old readerships 
and high culture in favor of a modern outlook. 
When it is found in the English-language historiography of 
India written by Indian historians today, the term feudalism is 
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really quite close to the Asian vernacular feudalisms that concern 
me in this paper: its usage is bound up in a debate about the colonial 
past as well as the nature and direction of present society. Here 
"feudal" refers to a specific social formation in a Marxist historicist 
schema (as in the work of R.S. Sharma) or more generally to 
relations of domination in the pre-colonial, colonial, and 
post-colonial period (as in the work of Ranajit Guha and the 
Subaltern Studies Group). 4 
Most, possibly all, Asian languages with historiographies linked 
to Western historiogr·aphy have vernacular equivalents of 
European-language "feudalism": Bengali samantatantm alternating 
with samantabad; Burmese padei-tha-ya-za (current usage) and 
ahmu-dan-sa-myei (in use from about 1940-1960); Thai sakdina; 
Indonesian feodal; Tagalog piyudal; Chinese {eng-chien; Japanese 
hoken; Vietnamese phong kien. Far from being a construct that 
tyrannizes, Asian-vernacular feudalism is a construct that 
essentializes. It can be found as the name of a period or social 
formation prescribed by party thinkers in the centralist 
historiography of socialist states (China, Vietnam, Burma) and 
as the name for relations of domination in a seditious discourse 
propounded by radical, marginalized, or disenfranchised groups 
(in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand). The obverse 
of pronouncements on the term in party cant is its appearance 
in a discourse of subversion. Thus, a military elite (Burma) may 
seek to explain its role by objectifying past society as feudal and 
highlighting its own modernist, non-royalist, anti-colonial policies, 
while at the same time a radical urban intelligentsia (Malaysia) 
attacks as feudal the dominant ideology which retains remnants 
of a monarchist political system by appealing for loyalty to the 
sultanate.5 
ln many cases the vernacular terms (Indonesian and Tagalog 
excepted, as they borrowed the European-language term) delve 
deep into the past by drawing on terms of great antiquity to 
translate European feudalism. Official Burmese histories after 
1962, for example, retranslated the term, rooting feudalism more 
deeply in Burmese language and history. The impulse here was 
to plant feudalism firmly in Asian soil. Yet the activity of analyzing 
!\sian feudalism (Chinese, Vietnamese, Thai, Burmese, whatever) 
also involved an act of discovery, not simply translation. Feudalism 
was already "there" to be found, excavated, and inserted ;nto 
contemporary language via ancient words. It is such an activity 
and act of discovery that I want to discuss here by means of Thai 
material. 
Metaphor and Proper Meaning 
Since the late 1940s the Thai term for feudalism, saktina, 
has come to be used in radical discoul'se to characterize past 
society and its present-day remnants, a radical discourse in which 
the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the urban intelligentsia 
participates. A particularly interesting example of a non-communist 
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radical treatise appeared in 198 2, the year of the Bangkok 
bicentennial celebrations, entitled Nine Reigns of the Chakkri 
Dynasty. In its arrangement of events in regnal sequence from 
1782 to the present-day (the incumbent monarch is the ninth in 
the line), the format of this history was patterned after "proper" 
history, but in fact this book is a counter-history, and counter 
to the brouhaha over Chakkri accomplishments celebrated during 
1982. 
The proper format is filled with refutations of Chakkri claims 
and achievements, and it candidly discusses one of the tabooed 
subjects of modern Thai history, the 1946 regicide of the eighth 
king. This counter-history, which provoked the political police 
to anest some people presumed to be involved in its publication 
on charges of lese-majesty, begins: "Thailand was ruled by the 
sakl:ina system for many centuries. The saktina lord ruled the 
land, establishing himself as the owner of all land, though he himself 
had expended no labor to clear it."6 This mention of saktina did 
not itself provoke the arrests, but I raise the example to illustrate 
how the term saktina now belongs to a discourse aimed at subverting 
the proper meanings of such legitimizing institutions as the 
monarchy and the Buddhist monkhood. 
The front cover bears a stamp declaring the work to be approved 
for the study of Thai history by the Fine Arts Department's Divison 
of Archaeology in the National Library (nc such division exists), 
and printed on the inside back cover is what appears to be the 
official logo of the Bangkok bicentennial year. These signs undo 
the fixed, legitimate, proper meanings of absolute authority by 
stating that one thing (the irreverent, scandal-ridden history that 
follows) is something quite different (an officially-approved text). 
As metaphors, these signs make an improper analogy and imply 
the possibility of transformation and change, questioning the 
absoluteness of legitimate authority and proper meaning and thus 
of law. In Michael Ryan's words, "Metaphors lead astray ..•• 
Metaphors arouse passion by inciting feelings that may not be 
compatible with a political institution whose laws re~uire a rational 
acceptance of unequivocal definitions of words." There is a 
direct connection between the unsanctioned transfer of meaning 
and resistance to sovereign authority, and Ryan goes on to show 
how metaphor - "characterized by transformation, alteration, 
relationality, displacement, substitution, errancy, equivocation, 
plurality, impropriety, or nonownership" - and sedition are 
interrelated. 
Improper meaning is a material force, says Ryan. Writers 
such as novelists, poets, and essayists are often in trouble with 
authoritarian governments because they play with the proper 
meanings: what is seditious is the meanings that writer's construe 
in their figurations of the world. In the following discussion of 
why there should be contention over the proper meanings of saktina 
I will trace the activity of translating European feudalism as Thai 
saktina, particularly in a 1957 text. After 1958 there was a distinct 
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reaction against the saktina = feudalism equation, a reaction which 
signalled a conflict about the nature of political authority. In 
my reading of the evidence, this reaction constituted a "war of 
interpretations" - not an academic debate, but a political war 
whose stakes were the terms in which reality was to be defined 
and indeed constructed. 8 
History of the Term Saktina 
The Thai term for feudalism, saktina, has been used commonly 
in Thai historical studies for the past ten years. But it is also 
found in the speech of educated people, not necessarily radical 
or anti-royalist. Convincing myself that I was engaging in harmless 
sociological observation, I eavesdropped on a conversation in 
Bangkok's Erawan Hotel Cafe in early 1982 and listened to a banker 
and his client discuss "the saktina manner" of another person, 
a woman not present, who evidently had a haughty, aristocratic 
air. The semantic range in spoken and written Thai includes: 
old-fashioned ideas and reactionary thinking; archaic institutions 
that linger on (the monarchy, the Buddhist monkhood); the 
perquisites and corruptions of clientship; corruption in the 
bureaucracy. If technological backwardness and landlordism are 
added to this list with the necessary changes being made the terms 
for feudalism in other Asian languages share a similar semantic 
range. 
For uneducated, low-income Thai speakers saktina might indicate 
a sense of class difference: they (the saktina with wealth, power, 
rank) vs. us (poor, powerless, low status). The derogatory, 
prejorative connotation is no more than thirty or forty years old; 
indeed, the term used to have auspicious connotations. A young 
Thai historian, born in 1954, whose father named him Saktina 
out of the best of intentions, told me ruefully that he is probably 
the last person in Thailand so named. He is the butt of much 
teasing from his university friends who have grown up with the 
ironic usages of the term in their speech. 
Saktina ramo, a witty novel published in 1980 by a doctor at 
Bangkok's Ramathibodi Hospital, pokes fun at the favoritism and 
status-climbing of staff and patients.9 Even the name of the hospital 
in the novel, Ramathipatai (combining Rama with the term 
"sovereign" that occurs in the Thai word for democracy), is 
word-play, tweaking the social pretensions of the novels' characters. 
An anesthetist sees his noble rank raised after he assists in the 
successful treatment of one of the royal white elephants, an 
auspicious beast which itself holds noble rank. If the anesthetist 
had demonstrated similar skills in healing a pauper there would 
be no cause for celebration. Part of the joke here is that the 
monarch's power to confer noble ranks was abolished in the 1932 
coup that ended the absolute monarchy. In the novel the referents 
of saktina I feudal are not only royal approval and prerogative 
but also the injustices and inequalities that derive from class 
differences. 
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In academic discourse today saktina refers to a social formation, 
the saktina system: the political, economic, social, and cultural 
order that characterized Thai society for some five hundred years. 
By no means do all historians and social scientists use "the saktina 
system" to signify past Thai society. Some emphasize patron-client 
relations, the corvee system, and monarchy, and reserve saktina 
for its ancient, technical meaning: rank quantified in terms of 
land or labor. But for historians who do use saktina it is part 
of a discourse about Thai society, past and present, a discourse 
that stands in critical relation to the present order and may even 
aim to displace it, particularly such saktina remnants as the 
monarchy and the Buddhist monkhood. 
The modern meanings for saktina, as outlined above, arise 
out of an Old Thai term, sakdina, found in the Thai civil and 
administrative code of the fifteenth century. There the term 
refers to positions in a socio-political hierarchy underpinned by 
economic relations. The positions were differentiated by amounts 
of land allocated, e.g., from 100,000 units for the highest-ranking 
prince, to 10,000 units for a noble, and down to 25 units for a 
commoner and 5 for a slave. The Old Thai term is a Sanskrit-Thai 
hybrid: Skt. sakti (power, the power of the god) bound to Thai 
na (ricefield). In the twentieth century there has been an ongoing 
debate about whether the units refer to actual plots, rather like 
fiefs, or whether they refer to units of manpower (e.g., one unit 
= one person), with some historians arguing that the social system 
evolved from one in which power was quantified in terms of land 
to one in which power was quantified in terms of people. Although 
the two terms are written and pronounced the same in Thai 
language, in English I transcribe the Old Thai term as sakdina 
and the Modern Thai term as saktina to distinguish them and to 
emphasize the new meanings created in the past thirty c;· fo!'t.v 
years. 
There is no evidence to my knowledge that the social system 
of pre-modern Siam was called the feudal I saktina system until 
the twentieth century, and in its earliest appearances, in 1935, 
for example, the trope was simply a loanword (fiwda!it), glossed 
something like "a system of dispersed centers of power." ro The 
objectification of past society as saktina society or the saktina 
system would seem to be a post-World War II development. As 
late as 1942-43, the Thai word proposed for feudal was a Sanskr·it 
neologism, phakdina, and the author mulling over the problem 
of equivalent terms concluded that "we have never had feudalism 
as the Europeans understand it, so we do not have an exact wor·c! 
for it."ll The sentence might well be reversed: "Since we do 
not have a wore! for it, we have never experienced feudalism." 
There is some evidence that the term saktina with its rnqdem, 
ironic meaning was spoken in leftist circles befor·e the end of 
World War II. One of the early union organizers has left a vivid 
account of a conversation at lunch in the publishing house where 
he worked. Kulap Saipmdit, a prominent socialist author· of the 
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time, leaned over the table and called Prince Sakon, the "Red 
Prince" in the royal family, a saktina, and the prince took the 
opportunity to explain the term as a graded register of rights 
to exploit.l2 Such exploitation as existed in the mid-1940s, the 
Red Prince argued, derived directly from the rights to exploit 
exercised by the saktina of old. 
In the decade or so following World War II the Old Thai term 
sakdina became fixed as a translation for European "feudal". 
Mahachon, the newspaper of the (CPT), contributed to the semantic 
shift by translating "feudalism" in the Marxist-Leninist corpus 
as "saktina;" its articles in 1947-48 sought to educate Thai readers 
about Marxist social formations. In 1950, in a work which remained 
the centerpiece of CPT theory until the 1970s, Thailand's social 
formation was labelled "semicolonial, semifeudal" along the lines 
of Mao's "The Chinese Revolufion and the Chinese Communist 
Party" of 1939.13 
But interest in Marxism - and the saktina and semi- saktina 
social formations - among Thai intellectuals in the post-war period 
cannot be tied only to CPT proselytizing. The 1947-58 decade 
was the first real heyday of Marxist study and writing, encouraged 
by the relatively open forums for thought and debate allowed 
by the political circumstances. The progressives of the time wanted 
to undermine the periodization of the Thai past according to 
conventional historiography, and they used the Marxist unilinear 
sequence of social formations - primitive commune, slave society, 
feudal I saktina society, capitalism, socialism- to do so.l4 
At this stage Thai intellectuals interested in analyzing the 
political economy of their society did not have Marx's 
long-unpublished Grundrisse available to them, and they knew 
nothing of the Asiatic mode of production. Asian society had 
to fit into a feudal or a semifeudal category. The analysis of 
social formations that first emerged in the late 1940s and early 
1950s adhered to a rigidly unilinear schema that had its origins 
in prevailing Sino-Soviet theory. In the Soviet Union the Asiatic 
mode had been written out of the Marxian sequence following 
a vigorous debate in the late 1920s and early 1930s as Stalinist 
historiography took hold. Whereas Thai political economists in 
recent years have begun to free themselves from a theoretical 
strait jacket, the post-war writers labored under an orthodoxy 
made all the more imposing by the fact that China had not :r~et 
distanced itself from the Russian revolutionary model; the 
Sino-Soviet dispute was to begin only toward the end of the 1950s.l5 
The Real Face of Thai Saktinaj Feudalism Today 
However common the unlinear sequence of social formations 
may be in a certain body of Thai writing after World War II, the 
formations were rather like shells as yet unfilled with Thai content. 
As if to take the incompleteness of the earlier analyses as a 
challenge, Jit Poumisak wrote The Real Face of Thai Saktina 
Today in 1957, toward the very end of the open post-war period.l6 
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In the reprintings of this work since 1973, 'Today', which gave 
the work a contemporary thrust, was dropped from the title, 
presumably so that the work wol'1d not seem outdated. What 
remains today are "saktina remnants" in consciousness: the 
monarchy and the Buddhist religion deemed essential to Thai 
identity and indispensable to proper government. 
Since the mid-1970s, Thai political economists have gone far 
beyond Jit's analysis in their investigations of Thailand's social 
formations, but the 1957 work is still powerful because of the 
way it configures saktina in consciousness. More than any other 
text of the period, it created new meanings for Old Thai sakdina, 
and the activity of creating these meanings is visible in language. 
The text demonstrates how and why the term comes to mean 
"backward agrarian order", "authoritarian rule", and "exploitative 
relations of production", transforming the Old Thai term into 
a trope. By a process of substitution and displacement Old Thai 
sakdina becomes Modern Thai saktina. Moreover, this improper 
transfer of meaning had seditious implications. The text was 
unavailable and unread from 1958 until 1973, it was banned by 
government decree in 1977, and its author was a political prisoner 
from 1958 until 1964. 
Early in the text the following definition is given for saktina: 
"Saktina" literally means "power in controlling the fields", 
and if we expand on this meaning to clarify the term we 
can say that saktina means "power over the land which 
was the crucial factor in agriculture, and agriculture in 
that age was the principal livelihood of the People". By 
explaining the term in. this way we are able to see roug·hly 
that the saktina system was a system bound up with "land". 
This definition occurs in the first third of the work, the section 
that sets out the universal evolutionary schema, the structure 
of the social order, and the socio-economic transformations that 
propel society forward. In this early section the term does not 
mean graded ranks (sakdina) in the hierarchy. It means power. 
Jit's words for power here are amnat or kamlang, i.e., physical 
strength, the power to command, a pushing-shoving kind of power 
that lies behind the light, heat, ceremony, ornate clothing, and 
Sanskrit mumbo-jumbo of royal rituals. 
The text anchors the tet·m in ancient texts and simultaneously 
shakes it loose from its moorings in them. A number of devices 
accomplish this liberation of the term, such as assertion of a 
backward agrarian order and the naming of this order the saktina 
system, a social system that rests on landed power. The saktina 
is a class of Land-Lords (chaothidin), lords of the land who wielded 
political, juridical, and cultural power and did not simply collect 
rents. The text juxtaposes features of this backward agrarian 
order against categories in the Marxian lexicon which are given 
in English, in roman typeface. These features are thus "hooked" 
onto Marxian correspondences, wrenching sakdina away from 
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its Old Thai moorings. 
The text subverts the Thai language by refusing to use royal 
language that standard Thai (proper discourse) prescribes for the 
ruler and his immediate family. The requirement to use royal 
language with the names of kings is avoided by using shorthand 
forms and by using such generic terms as kshatriya or committee 
chairman. Proper royal language isolates the ruler and consigns 
him to the category of which there is (almost) only one: himself. 
The ruler is not to be touched by ordinary language and is thereby 
made pur·e ancl sncr·ecl. By refusing to use royal language, Jit's 
text dcfie~ these linguistic conventions and recasts "king" as the 
"com mit tee chairman" who safeguards the profits of the saktina 
class. 
The text mocks the behavior and habits of the saktina class 
and attributes to this idle class the motivation not to create beauty 
or enhance culture but to satisfy its appetites self-indulgently. 
ln proper discourse during modern times the appetites of Thai 
rulers for power, wealth, sex, or sensual pleasure should be 
modulated and suppressed in discourse. Here they are brought 
to the surface and exposed. 
Finally - and this device is particulm·ly important in the 
remaking of Old Thai sakdina - the saktina system is hooked onto 
European FEUDALISM. The Old Thai term is taken from its ancient 
context and identified with European feudalism by pairing: "The 
saktina system (FEUDAL SYSTEMi was the system of production 
in society that succeecled the Lhat system (SLAVE SYSTEM)". 
On the face of it, such an identification of Thai society and 
European or ancient or· South American societies is preposterous. 
Yet it is by insisting throughout on a foreign signified that the 
text seeks to make saktina identical to FEUDAL and attaches 
the evolution of Thai society to a sequence of socinl l'orJllutions 
that transcends the individualized experience of any on0 societ~'· 
The foreign signifiers paired with saktina make saktina an essential 
stage in the evolution of human society, not just Thai society. 
The Thai terms ancJ examples hook onto the foreign term 
FEL'DAL and pull it into the language; simultaneously, the foreign 
term clasps the Thai term and pulls it away from its Old Thai 
moorings. This capacity of the foreign term to pull saktina to 
itself is exemplified in the following statement: "l!er·e is the o!'igin 
of the word FEL:DALISM, the ter·m for· the English saktina system, 
or· FEUDALISME [sic] in French". Note that this is the reverse 
of "saktina is the term for the Thai feudal system", which is what 
we might expect. llere Europe is made "the other". The way 
Jit's sentence represents the issue, only language me.kes saktina 
and FEUDALISM different. Yet far from eliding the differences 
between the two sif~ns, the tvpography actually heightens the 
alienation inherent in the pairing or them. 
The stuff of culturai borrowing is labelling, naming, and 
renaming, but clppearances to the contrar·y, this labelling does 
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not create semantic identity. Although such pairs as saktina I 
feudalism are used interchangeably in the text to give the 
impression of identity, the real relationship between saktina and 
feudal is one of metaphor rather than one of identity. With Thai 
signifieds constantly intruding and driving a wedge between the 
Thai term and the European term, a space is created for metaphor 
to play in and beget more metaphor. 
By means of this metaphoric play saktina springs free of its 
moorings in the ancient texts and is set in motion, acquiring a 
kind of motility. Yet because the phonological container is the 
same for sakdina and saktina, the new meanings created are rooted 
deep in Thai history. And Old Thai sakdina now becomes but an 
element, one of many manifestations, of Modern Thai saktina, 
the backward agrarian order vestiges of which persist to the present 
day. In other words, the text takes the supernatural stuff out 
of sakti and realizes the term's (real) economic content. 
Jit Poumisak's 1957 text did not itself create the new sign 
saktina; any number of previous writers referred to saktina society. 
What I claim for this text is that the mechanics of creating the 
new sign, if 1 may put it that way, are observable: the "play" 
with the term, the toying with the rules of Thai grammar and 
proper discourse, are visible. The high language appropriate to 
sacral kingship is subverted by folksy idioms and ironic asides. 
The substitutions and displacements as well as the mocking sarcastic 
wit all serve to push aside proper discourse. 
The metaphoric use of saktina marks an epistemological break 
and a change in the semantic code. To explore these matters 
is beyond the scope of this brief paper, and I will just say here 
that Jit and his confreres were constructing a new sociology, 
a new classificatory knowledge against the sociology upheld by 
such people as Luang Wichit Watthakan (1898-1B62), for many 
years director-general of the Fine Arts Department of Thailand 
and a prolific essayist and historian. Wichit was instrumental 
in explaining the 1932 coup that ended the absolute monarchy. 
lle assigned the proper meanings to 1932 that are with us today 
by braiding together the plot of d",7Wsty El!Hl the plot of 
nation-state.l7 Jit's The Real Face is a rewriting of the works 
of Luang Wichit and others in terms of a different epistemology, 
a different sociology, and a restructured historiography. 
Jit's attack on proper meanings by means of metaphoric play 
had internationalist and political meanings that were seditious. 
It is through the assertion of proper meaning that absolute authority 
exerts itself, and the assertion of improper meanings in such texts 
as Jit's entered into the raison d'etre of the 1958 coup of Field 
Marshal Sarit Thannarat. Improper meaning - the displacement 
of proper meaning is a material force, as Ryan says, and it was 
met by material force: incarceration. Jit Pournisak and other 
writers who had toyed with the proper meanings and asserted 
an alternative sociology were jailed, and the pluralism of the 
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1950s came to an end. 
A Different Historiographic Paradigm Comes to Dominate 
The publication of The Real Face in 1957 came at the end 
of a period in post-war history that I described earlier as open 
in relation to the period that followed. The American alliance 
that was building throughout the 1950s (American technical and 
economic aid began in 1950; the SEA TO pact was signed in 1954) 
was inevitable only by hindsight; the Phibun governments of 1947-58 
played both sides of the street, and Thai delegations of students 
and writers travelled to Russia and China as late as the end of 
the 1950s.l8 Through the writings of Jit Poumisak and others 
in the literary-journalist world, an articulate element of the Thai 
intelligentsia was trying to forge an internationalism inspired 
by the Russian and Chinese revolutions, especially by the Chinese 
communist victory in 1949. The way that saktina operates in 
Jit's text - the way that saktina hooks onto FEUDAL - is a sign 
of these internationalist ambitions. Thus I relate the saktina 
= feudal equation to a movement, an ideology, and a cast of mind 
that had liberating and utopian aspirations. 
When Sarit took power in 1958 he imposed a monolithic hold 
on the military and the bureaucracy and propounded a political 
philosophy emphasizing indigenous values and institutions at the 
expense of foreign models and ideologies.l9 A paradigm congruent 
with Sarit's political philosophy came to dominate Thai studies, 
a paradigm which drew a sharp distinction between European 
feudalism and precapitalist, premodern Thai society. Emphasizing 
the centro! of manpower rather than land as the basis of political · 
power, the paradigm saw patron-client relations rather than class 
as the determining factor in Thai social relations. Thailand was 
unique, so the argument went, and an historicist theory of 
development was not applicable to Thai society. 
There are several key texts that exemplify this new paradigm 
in Thai studies. Of particular interest in relation to Jit's 1957 
work is Khukrit Pramote's Farang saktina, which appeared serially 
in late 1957 and earlv 1958.20 This text mocked the 
characterization of Thai so~iety as saktina. The preface stated: 
I have titled this book Farang saktina for the sake of having 
a convenient expression, not because the meaning of farang 
fiwdalit (European feudalism) and Thai saktina is the same, 
or because they are the same phenomenon. They are 
comparable only insofar as they occur at the same time. 
The Thai social system in ancient times was Thai, the ancient 
European social system was European. They had no 
connection with each other whatsoever. 
It is difficult to read these sentences without seeing Jit and the 
others behind every one, althougk KhukriL never lowers himself 
to identify his targets on the left. The book is filled with cartoons 
of knigrts jousting, coats of arms, and the mediaeval baron receiving 
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his loyal retainers. The book ostensibly explains the terms that 
appear in roman typeface: VASSAL, EXCOMMUNICATION, 
WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR (these familiar to us all) plus a host 
of obscure terms from heraldry and Vulgar Latin. Written with 
Khukrit's customary verve and wit, the book obfuscates as much 
as it explains. What is a Thai r·eader to do with QUAS VULGAS 
ELEGERITLES QUUIELS LA COMMUNAUTE DE VOSTRE 
ROIAUIVIE? Indeed, what is anyone! By consigning European 
feudalism to the exotic, by caricaturing it, by packing the lot 
off to Camelot and Hollywood, Khukrit alienated FEUDALISM 
from saktina. He denied the sign that Jit's text helped to create. 
In so doing, he also denied that socio-economic processes play 
a fundamental role in the evolution of human society, and this 
is why his thought is characteristic of the old sociology. Khukrit 
is a real saktina intellectual.21 
Another text that speaks to Jit's analyo.is but keeps Jit offstage 
is Khachorn Sukkhapanij's The Status of Phrai, the first edition 
of which appeared in December 1959 just after the Sarit period 
began. This text argued that manpower, not land, lay at the base 
of Thai political power. There are passages in this text that seem 
to be explicit refutations of Jit's thesis; and Khachorn appends 
a note of his historian's "proof" of the proper meaning of Old Thai 
sakdina.22 He puts Old Thai sakdina back where it belongs, so 
to speak, in the Old Thai law code, with the meaning of ranks 
graded and quantified according to putative land allocations. He 
too denies the new sign saktina. 
The most important analysis in English of Thai society, Akin 
Rabibhadana's The Organization of Thai Society in the Early 
Bar:gkok Period (1969), also dates from the period after the 1958 
Sarit coup. The period delineated by the title notwithstanding, 
Akin's representation of Thai society has been taken to cover 
the fourteenth through the first half of the nineteenth centuries. 
Akin assumed that premodern mainland Southeast Asian states 
were underpopulated, an assumption that is explicit but never 
really tested in his exposition. This demographic assumption had 
two significant implications for the nature of rule in premodern 
Thai society: 1) as there was an abundance of land and a shortage 
of population, the key to the ruler's power was his ability, by means 
of compulsion or incentives, to acquire manpov.er; power was 
manpower; 2) The shor·tage of manpower was a deterr·ence against 
tyranny, for any oppressed subject could always flee an unjust 
ruler, resettle on the unclaimed land that lay about in abundance, 
and start a new life. 
Akin's understanding of Thai social organization may be traced 
to both Western and Thai antecedents. On the one hand was the 
social and cultural anthropology he studied at Cornell University 
where he did his !\laster's degree in the mid-1960s. His 
structuralist-functionalist and systems-maintenance model, never 
made explicit in the study itself, owes much to a course he took 
on African studies, where he found an emphasis on labor, 
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patron-client ties, and segmentary kinship, and a debate among 
African scholars on the importance of land vs. people.23 On the 
other hand, the Thai text at the core of Akin's work is Khachorn's 
study which Akin rewrites and extends. Akin, too, denies the 
new sign saktina and seeks to restore its proper meaning: "The 
sakdina (dignity marks) system was a device which served as the 
most accurate guide to the di(ferent statuses of the whole 
population".24 In this assertion of the proper meaning of sakdina 
Akin follows Khachorn and Khukrit. The dominant Thai 
historiography converged with American anthropology in Akin's 
analysis of premodern Thai society. His paradigm is congruent 
with the historiographic mode of the Sarit era that had come 
to dominate Thai studies after 1958. 
The very categories - religion, the state, law, custom, kin 
relations, values, norms - that fill Akin's analysis as explanations 
for this patron-client system "enter into the constitutive structure 
of the mode of production in precapitalist social formations".25 
These are the extra-economic sanctions by which the mode of 
production operates. Yet in Akin's analysis, these sanctions, which 
he has described in per'suasive detail, remain unconnected to the 
productive base. What is missing in the study is the link between 
these sanctions and how the economy worked. Akin ignored the 
very thing Jit had focused on: labor-power and the means of 
production, especially land. It is possible to read Akin's entire 
study without realizing that the majority of Thailand's population 
in premodern times was -a rice-cultivating peasantry. 
ln its neglect of economic matters Akin's study comes close 
to what one writer has termed "the religious-structural" approach 
to the economy.26 Scholars who adopt this approach do not pay 
attention in their studies to the economic aspects of society, 
because when the Thai monarch ruled virtuously, there would 
be a natural and smooth flow of resources from clients to pati"Ons. 
Clients would willingly cooperate in bringing their society closer 
to the ideal Buddhist state. In such a picture peasants are never 
disgruntled at the economic exactions made of them, and while 
Akin's study allowed for conflict and client discontent at corvee 
demands, the conflict was not economic. He stresses that the 
relationship between client and patron was voluntary, "dyadic 
and contractual'•.27 In contrast to Jit and other writers of the 
1947-58 decade, Akin as well as Khukrit and Khachorn deemphasize 
economics and highlight norms, values, and individual choice as 
checks on tyranny by the patron. 
Fur·thermore, what underlines the differences between Jit 
et a!. and Akin, Khukrit and Khachorn after 1958 is a debate over 
the nature of political authority. For Jit, royal absolutism, the 
political system of the feudal I saktina period, was exploitative 
and created class antagonisms. For the latter writers, royal 
absolutism in premodern times made "the system" work. But 
I believe this post-1958 paradigm must be seen in relation to the 
way Sar'it's military regime revived the monarchy fr0m the low 
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prestige that had been its fate since the 1932 coup. Sarit changed 
the monarchy in Thai politics from a passive object to the active 
subject that prevails today. The paradigm of a unique Thai social 
system with a monarch as head of state served to underpin the 
adjustments that were being made to the way the military 
legitimated its dominance. 
In their writings, Khukr·it, Khachorn, and Akin denied the new 
sign by denying the metaphoric relationship between saktina and 
feudal. The terms could no longer stand for one another. As 
we saw, Khukrit stated that the terms were unrelated, though 
they were synchronous (they lay alongside each other in time), 
and he asserted the differences between saktina and feudal over 
and against similarities and identity. He sought to deny the new 
sign and restore the proper meaning of Old Thai sakdina as a 
quantified, graded hierarchy of ranks. Modern Thai saktina lost 
its motility and was stripped of its meaning~. and the metaphoric 
possibilities of Old Thai sakdina wer·e declared illegitimate. In 
Ryan's language, they constituted an unsanctioned transfer of 
meaning. 
The Return of Saktina 
In the explosion of Thai-language historical studies touched 
off by the dramatic and sometimes violent events of 1973-76, 
Modem Thai saktina returned as a configuration for premodern 
Thai society.28 After fourteen years of oblivion as a censored 
book, Jit's text was rediscovered along with the earlier studies 
of Thai political economy and social realist literature dating from 
the 1950s. Students and lecturers who read The Real Face of 
Thai Saktina Today for the first time in that three-year period 
found in it a discourse on past society that gave voice to the 
political consciousness awakened by the mass protests of October 
1973. The naming of premodern society as saktina was and is 
a way or le,wing that society behind, of objectifying it and 
distancing it from present consciousness. 
Today, saktina is a term used by academics as well as political 
dissidents. With a more sophisticated understanding- of Marxism, 
knowledge of the Asiatic mode of production, 1:tt1d availability 
of Grundrisse, Thai scholars are trying to determine the special 
Thai characteristics of saktina which some writer·s now refer· 
to as the Asiatic mode of production. Thus the dilemma of ,Jit's 
analysis - saktina is the same as feudal but something Thai makes 
it different - continues today in Thai socioanalysis that seeks 
to define the country's social formations. How is it· possible to 
describe Thai sociai formations (past, present, future) in such 
a way that the Thai pm·ticulars m·e individualised and interact 
within a scheme of universal evolutionary change'! In their· 
endeavors, Thai university economists find themselves at odds 
with the CPT which for years insisted on a Macist semicolonial, 
semifeudal formation. Yet the debate about the rcHI nature of 
Thai social formations is a shai'ed one: academics, urban thinkers, 
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returnees from the jungle, and revolutionaries still in the jungle 
all participate in this debate. 
Faced with the return after October 1973 of saktina as a trope 
for premodern society, some writers have continued to insist on 
the non-equivalence of saktina and feudal, very much in the mode 
of Khachorn, Khukrit, and Akin. Writing in 1975, a prominent 
novelist and essayist reacted against the new political consciousness 
by arguing for the proper definition of saktina: status as reflected 
in certain rights and duties. And she emphatically resisted the 
characterization of modern society after 1932 as partially saktina 
or containing saktina elements. These had all been eliminated 
by legislation, she argued.29 This writer's defense of the proper 
meaning of saktina I sakdina was aroused by the attacks of students 
and young lecturers on classical Thai literature. It was, they 
said, saktina literature. 
An even more striking example of how the debate over saktina 
= feudal continues to be polarized may be found in a thesis 
submitted to the Thai Army College in 1980, "Saktina" and 
Subversion by the Opposing Side, by Colonel Sihadet Bunnag. The 
author argues that the saktina system has long since faded away, 
but "the opposing side" (i.e., the CPT) uses the saktina 
characterization to attack Thailand's legitimizing institutions: 
"Saktina retains great significance for the opposing side. The 
attack on saktina has an impact on our highest institutions and 
the work of the contemporary state".30 The military officer 
is concerned about the use of saktina in the speech of students 
and in the lyrics of popular songs which find their way into the 
heads of today's youth and give them distorted ideas about the 
history of their forefathers. 3T He finds that the new sign, saktina 
= feudal, is predominantly Marxist-Leninist and is propagated 
by the CPT, and his thesis is an argument against this new sign. 
He insists on the proper· meaning of sakdina, and he refers with 
approval to 1\hachorn and 1\hukrit and the "rights and duties" 
interpretation of the Old Thai term while rejecting the emphasis 
in Jit's text on land as the basis of saktina power. 32 As in the 
case of Nine Reigns of the Chakkri Dynasty, the link between 
saktina - the transformation of Old Thai sakdina - and sedition 
is direct. Saktina is improper transfer of meaning. It is metaphor. 
The military author wants to take steps to minimize the usage 
of improper transfer of meaning which he deems to be a threat 
to the state's well-being. 
Conclusion 
There are scarcelv anv Western historians who find feudal 
or feudalism a useful 'category for analyzing Thai society.33 Yet 
Thai scholars have turned increasingly to the term to characterize 
the premodern social formation. Over the past ten years Thai 
thinkers - inside the universities and outside, in the world of 
journalism, and in the resistance movement in the jungle - have 
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debated the saktina = feudal equation and the particularistic Thai 
elements that are manifested in "Thai feudalism".34 In Thai 
language feudal along with such terms as semicolonial, semicolonial 
capitalist, dependent capitalist, and so forth, are crucial coordinates 
on a grid of contrasting positions. They stand in dialectical relation 
to one another. 
I began this essay by asking what notice should be taken of 
this debate. In order to answer this question I sketched the history 
of saktina = feudal in the post-World War II period, tracing Modern 
Thai saktina back to Old Thai sakdina at:d arguing that while the 
new sign saktina depends on the Old Thai term, it also represents 
a liberation and transformation of the ancient term. The 1958 
coup of Field Marshal Sarit marks a sharp break in Thai 
consciousness as signalled by reactions after 1958 to the assertion 
of saktina = feudal by Thai radical thinkers before 1958. Such 
thinkers after 1958 as Khukrit, Khachorn, and Akin rejected the 
feudal char·acterization of Thai society and proposed that saktina 
and feudalism were unrelated. This position belonged to a 
historiography shaped by a monolithic, authoritarian regime that 
brought the Thai monarchy back to politics and asserted the 
uniqueness of Thai society. And the uniqueness paradigm served 
as a foil ag·ainst the internationalist aspirations of the progressive 
thinkers between 1947-58. 
In the Thai case, among the signifieds in the "vernacular term 
= feudal" sign are the monarchy and the Buddhist monkhood which 
today are regarded as saktina remnants. The debate about saktina 
= feudal at some point touches these legitimizing institutions, 
as the thesis presented to the Thai Army College makes clear. 
In a state whose legitimacy continues to derive from the monarchy 
and the Buddhist monkhood the saktina = feudal sign can, under 
certain circumstances, be deemed a danger. The different positions 
that people take over the proper meaning of saktina I sakdina 
issue from strong feelings about the nature of legitimate authority. 
No one has ever been arrested for writing or speaking about saktina, 
but the term exists in a discourse that has subversive and seditious 
intent. The metaphor has material force. 
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